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DEFENSES UNDER THE F.E.L.A.
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM AND ELMER I. SCHWARTZ*
In order to place defenses under the F.E.L.A. in their proper per-
spective, it is helpful to consider their historical background as well as
their present status.
Before the I.E.L.A., the claims of injured workmen, whether
employed by railroads or other industries, were controlled by the law
of master and servant, as developed under the common law. Along
with the advent of the railroads themselves, the law was embellished
with the judicial brain children of the era. These new concepts came to
be known as the fellow-servant doctrine, assumption of risk, and con-
tributory negligence. They were originated and developed in common
ground. Not entirely identical in conception, they conjoined and over-
lapped in many applications. The overlapping areas first concealed, then
created a state of confusion which, in turn, created more.1 In time, the
three defenses were used almost interchangeably. As the establishment
of any one of the three had the effect of defeating liability, it was not
important to distinguish the defenses sharply or carefully, so long as the
facts would sustain one of them.
FELLOW-SERVANT DOCTRINE
The rule that an employer is not liable to his (or its) employee for
the negligent acts or omissions of another employee was apparently first
announced by Lord Abinger in Priestly v. Fowler,' decided in 1837.
There an employees of a butcher went along with the driver of the
butcher's van to help make deliveries for his employer. Following an
accident, he complained that the employer was negligent in not having
the van in a proper state of repair, and in overloading it. After a verdict
for plaintiff, the judgment was set aside (arrested). The court said, first,
that the employee could have quit his job,4 and, second, that to permit
liability would encourage the employee to become careless.5 Soon there-
Members of the firm of Metzenbaum, Schwartz & Disbro of Cleveland, Ohio.
'Rutledge, J., in Owens v. Union Pacific R. Co., 319 U.S. 715, 720.
3 M. & W. 1.
3 "Servant" was the term used, and carried 'with it the implication of servi-
tude, as distinguished from the present day relationship of employer and employee.
4 "The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master,
and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends
injury to himself; and in most of the cases in which danger may be incurred, if not
in all, he is just as likely to be acquainted with the probability and extent of it
as the master."
5 "In fact, to allow this sort of action to prevail would be an encouragement
to the servant to omit that diligence and caution which he is duty bound to
exercise on the behalf of his master, to protect him against the misconduct or
negligence of others who serve him, and which diligence and caution, while they
protect the master, are a much better security against any injury the servant may
sustain by the negligence of others engaged under the same master, than any
recourse against his master for damages could possibly afford."
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after, it was held in Murray v. South Carolina R. Co.' that a railroad
company was not liable to a fireman who lost a leg7 due to the negligence
of his engineer. Only a year later, in 1842, the fellow-servant doctrine
was accorded the dignity of authority in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester
R. Co.' Chief Justice Shaw there held that the responsibility of the
master under respondeat superior applied only to strangers, but that the
servant's claim must be maintained, if at all, upon contract. The court
cited the Priestly and Murray cases, and thus began a line of authorities,9
each having the cumulative effect of entrenching the doctrine more
deeply and firmly. In 1850 the rule was first applied to the case of a
railroad employee in England,'0 where it was known as the doctrine of
common employment."
As industry expanded and our economic structure changed ac-
cordingly, individual employers were succeeded by corporations, which
grew and sometimes consolidated with or were replaced by even larger
corporations. The personal employer had given way to the inanimate
corporation.
Injury to an employee by corporate negligence could occur only by
a breach of duty by some person, an employee or agent, who in turn must
have been a fellow-servant of the injured employee. Thus, the larger
the shop or plant, the less the liability because each person was a fellow-
servant of each other employee about him.
The injustice of the rule became obvious as the burden of shop
casualties caused by negligence was thrown upon the one least able to
bear it, the employee. 2 Courts rarely abrogate rules of law as deeply
embedded as the fellow-servant doctrine. The alternative has been to
construe strictly and to establish exceptions, sometimes ingeniously con-
trived."3 These included exceptions based upon the employer's selection
61 McMullan (S.C.) 385 (1841).
7 A verdict of $1,500 was set aside.
84 Mete. (Mass.) 49. Railroad was held not liable to engineman for negli-
gence of switchman.
9 Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill (N.Y.) 592 (1844). Hayes v. Western R. Corp.,
3 Cushing (Mass.) 270 (1849). Coon v. Syracuse & Utica R. Co., 1 Selden (N.Y.)
492 (1851). Gillshannon v. Stony Brook R. Corp., 10 Cushing (Mass.) 288 (1852).
Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R. Co., 23 Pa. (11 Harris) 384 (1854). Sullivan v.
Mississippi, Missouri, etc. R. Co., 11 Iowa 421 (1860).
10 Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle & Berwick Ry. Co., 5 Exch. 343.
1 Valler v. South Eastern Ry. Co., 32 L.J. (Ex.) 205 (1863). Lovegrove
v. London & Brighton Ry. Co., 33 L. J. (C.P.) 329 (1864). Morgan v. The Vale of
Neath Ry Co., Law Rep. I Q.B. 149 (1865). Tunney v. Midland R. Co., L.R. 1
C.P. 296 (1866).
12 Decades later, Vorkmen's Compensation Laws codified the view that the
State should undertake responsibility to spread the financial loss among employers
for all industrial accidents rather than attach liability upon a particular employer
for each individual accident.
13 Agnew, J., in O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley R. Co., 59 Pa. 239, 247.
(1868) ". . . But human life is too precious to force the doctrine beyond its
reasonable bounds .... "
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or employment of incompetent co-employees, violation of duties imposed
by law, non-delegable duties, superior and subordinate employees. A
refinement of the last exception was where the same or equivalent work
was performed in separate departments.
Interestingly, Ohio courts took the lead in the trend from the
stringent fellow-servant rule. In Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens 4 a
railroad was held liable to one of its engineers for the negligence of his
superior, the conductor. Caldwell, J., delivering the opinion of the court,
sought to meet the issue head on and to disregard the Farwell"5 and
Murrayl6 cases and the reasoning upon which they were based. Hitch-
cock, C. J., in a concurring opinion, adopted a more conservative ap-
proach and distinguished the decided case from the earlier authorities,
while Spaulding, J. dissented, substantially on the ground of stare decisir.
Soon thereafter in another Ohio decision, the same subject was treated
extensively and thoroughly in C. C. & C. R. Co. v. Keary,'7 where
recovery was again allowed to a brakeman for injury caused by negli-
gence of his superior co-employee, the conductor.'" Warden, J., in a
concurring opinion, cut through the niceties of subtle distinctions to
challenge the basis of the rule,' 9 and with tongue in cheek chided its
14 20 Ohio 415 (1851).
15 See note 8, supra.
10 See note 6, supra.
173 0. S. 201 (1854).
1SRanney J., Id. at page 218:
"But they (employees) cannot be made to bear losses arising from care-
lessness in conducting the train, over which their employer gave them no power
or control, either separately or collectively, until we are prepared to say that
justice and public policy require the consequences of duty omitted-by one party
to be visited upon the other, although stripped of all power to prevent such
consequences."
19 Id. at p. 226:
"But, leaving room for the ascertainment of all necessary exceptions, I would
certainly hold the employer to his common liability for the negligence of one into
whose hands he has put the power of doing hurt, as well when the plaintiff was
also in his employment as when the wrong was done to a stranger, and wholly
without reference to the superiority, the equality, or the inferiority of the plaintiff,
relatively to the negligent employee. I would not except the case of a conductor
(for instance), because he happened to be in command. He is no more the
representative or organ-in other words, the agent-of the railroad company
than the brakeman, or any other subordinate. The conductor is an agent ap-
pointed to command; the brakeman is appointed to obey; but commandment and
obedience are alike acts of agency. The fact of superiority or subordination in
the position of the agents can, in my opinion, be important only in a case which
shows the inferior to have sustained the hurt through his obedience to some order
of the superior. But where the hurt is not a necessary consequence of the subordi-
nation, and is not otherwise connected with it than by the necessary presence of
the inferior in his place, I see no peculiar warrant of recovery in the fact that
the person negligent was in a place of command. I look upon every officer of the
railroad company, no matter how high in trust, or low in responsibility, as its
agent and nothing but its agent. None of them is the corporation; all of them are
[Vol. 17
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author.2"
Ultimately, Congress abolished the fellow servant rule by enact-
ment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.2 ' Although the fellow-
servant rule has not been a defense under the F.E.L.A. its philosophy
was not easily dispelled from the thinking of the courts. After 1908
assumption of risk remained as the only complete defense to the rail-
roader's claim for redress for injuries negligently inflicted, and that had
already become subject to some limitations.22
ASSUMPTION OF RzsK
The rule that a servant assumed the risk of certain dangers of in-
jury during his employment was first given judicial expression, along
with the fellow-servant doctrine, in Priestly v. Fowler.23 The two de-
fenses were often confused; but, as previously stated, it made little differ-
ence upon which theory recovery was denied. However, it did become a
matter of serious consequence when exceptions were made to the fellow-
servant rule, and particularly when the fellow-servant doctrine was
abolished by the F.E.L.A.
Assumption of risk was based on the theory that it was part of a
contract of employment, express or implied,2 4 that the employee agreed
that the dangers ordnarily incident to the discharge of his duty should
be at his own risk. It proceeded on the theoretical, but fictitious, assump-
tion that the added hazards were taken into consideration in arriving at
the basis of wage payments; hence, the employee's agreement to assume
additional risks was supposedly reflected in increased compensation.
Further, the employee had the "right" to quit when he pleased.
its representatives for some purpose, and to some extent. The conductor of a
railroad, for instance, does not select his subordinates. He does not, in fact,
agree to stand all the risks of their negligence; he merely agrees to be faithful
himself in holding them to their respective duties. If he be faithful-if no negli-
gence of his particular duty can be imputed to him-I can find something much
better than a precedent of an action by him against the company for the negli-
gence of one under him in employment."
20d. at p. 222:
"... We begin now to appreciate the ludicrous alarm of Lord Abinger, at
what he supposes to be some of the consequences of allowing a servant to sue his
master for the negligence of a fellow-servant. We can discover whose interests
he has in mind, and what is the source of his anxiety, when he says: 'The master,
for example, would be liable to the servant for the negligence of the chamber-
maid in putting him into a damp bed !' etc."
2135 STAT. 65, c. 1949 (1908), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq.
"Every common carrier . . . shall be liable . . . for such injury or death
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier . . ." Similar language was also used in the first
Federal Employers' Act, 34 Stat. 232, c. 5073 (1906), which had been held invalid
on other grounds in Employers Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
22 See footnote 29, infra.
23 See footnotes 2 and 4, supra.
24 Almost invariably implied.
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Assumed risk derives from the maxim volenti non fit injura.2" The
assent (volenti) has been interpreted as extending even further than
under the contract theory. Although the employee under his contract of
employment did not assume the risk that his employer would violate a
statute enacted for his safety, it was held that if he was consciously aware
of such violation he assented, and hence assumed the risk.2" However,
there was a trend away from this stringent view.2 7
This far reaching use of the defense of assumption of risk by the
courts to deny recovery to railroad employees received attention from
Congress. As early as 1893 assumption of risk was eliminated as a de-
fense to an action under the Safety Appliance Act,28 and under the
F.E.L.A. as originally enacted there was no assumed risk where violation
of a statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury
or death.29 The 1939 Amendment of the F.E.L.A. finally obliterated
from that law "every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk."' 0
Some of the similarities and distinctions between assumption of risk
and contributory negligence will be discussed under the latter heading.3 1
Basically, in a negligence action, the plaintiff must first establish
negligence of the defendant; otherwise the problem of a defense is not
reached. Consequently, the defense of assumption of risk presupposes
that there had been negligence by the defendant. This is especially true
under the F.E.L.A. where it has been repeatedly held that negligence
is the basis of liability and that the railroad is not an insurer3 2 Under
the Safety Appliance Acts, however, negligence need not be shown to
25 "To the consenting no injury is done." "A person who consents to a thing
cannot complain of it as an injury." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Porter v. Toledo
Terminal R. Co., 152 Ohio S. 463, 90 N. E. 2d 142 (1950). "That to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law an injury." 44 Words and Phrases 368.
Milliken v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio S. 381, 144 N.E. 264 (1924).
2 6 Denver, R. G. R. Co. v. Norgate, C.C.A. 8th, 141 Fed. 247 (1905). Martin
v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 118 Iowa 148, 91 N.W. 1034 (1902).
27 Narramore v. Cleveland, C.C.&St.L. Ry. Co., C.C.A. 6th, 96 Fed. 298
(1899).
28 27 STAT. 532, c. 196, see. 8, 45 U.S.C. 7.
29 35 STAT. 66, c. 147, sec. 4 (1908), 45 U.S.C. 54.
30 53 STAT. 1404, c. 685, sec. 1 (1939), 45 U.S.C. 54. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1942).
31lnfra, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
32 Seaboard Air Line R. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (1914). New York Central
R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 150 (1916). Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S.
53, 61 (1949).
But see opinions by Justice Frankfurter advocating the insurance principle
of workmen's compensation laws to replace negligence as the basis of compen-
sation for injuries to railroad employees. Concurring in Wilkerson v. McCarthy,
336 U.S. 53, 65 (1949). Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. R. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 437
(1949). Dissenting in Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 344 U.S. 407, 410
(1953).
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establish liability; violation of the Act itself creates liability33 and bars
all defenses, even including contributory negligence.
34
Considerable confusion has always existed with reference to as-
sumption of risk. Not only has the term been used in conjunction with
the fellow-servant rule and contributory negligence, but frequently
loosely and interchangeably with both. Perhaps even more confusing
was the argument that the railroad was not negligent because the plaintiff
had assumed the risk. 5 Whether or not assumption of risk was con-
sidered an affirmative defense, in the nature of confession and avoidance,
it would have been more accurate to say that the railroad was not liable
because the plaintiff had assumed the risk, and had thus absolved the
railroad of a legal duty toward him. Nevertheless, the effect was the
same. In a number of cases the court placed the responsibility on the
employee, but found that the railroad was not negligent, and conse-
quently not liable. It was so held in instances where the track curved so
sharply that cars would not couple properly, 36 where a station platform
was in disrepair and a station agent who was injured thereby presumably
had knowledge of the danger,37 where no bell or whistle was sounded
to notify the employee of an approaching train even though there was
insufficient distance between tracks, 38 and where a yard employee alighted
in the dark from an engine and fell into a ditch along the track in the
railroad yard.3 9
After the 1939 Amendment, eliminating entirely assumption of
risk as a defense, it became important for the railroad to argue and
emphasize the non-negligence concept of assumed risk. This was so
because the plaintiff's claim could no longer be defeated by saying that
the acts that caused his injury were hazards or risks that he assumed as
part of his employment, even though the defendant had been negligent.
Consequently, it was urged that failure to protect the employee against
the ordinary hazards of his occupation did not amount to negligence on
the part of the railroad.
This approach was used with temporary success in Tiller v. Atltanic
33 O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. P. Co., 338 U.S. 384 (1949). Carter v. Atlantic
& St. A. B. R. Co., 338 U.S. 430 (1949) Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.,
339 U.S. 96 (1950)
34 35 STAT. 66, c. 149, sec. 3 (1908), 45 U.S.C. 53.
35"... there may be assumption of rick by an employee without negligence
either on his part or on the part of his employer .. ." Tiller v. Atlaptic Coast Line
. Co., C.C.A. 4th, 12S F. 2d 420, 423 (1942); reversed, 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
36Tuttle v. Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Ry., 122 U.S. 189 (1887).
37 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Aeby, 275 U.S. 426, 430 (1928).
38 Toledo, St Louis & Western R. Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165 (1928). See
also Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 418 (1891), where failure to sound bell
or whistle was held not negligence; and further, if plaintiff was injured it must
have been by his contributory negligence. His knowledge of the dangers of train
operations was not called an assumed risk.
39 Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. Co. v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7 (1929).
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Coast Line R. Co. ,40 where a railroad policeman inspecting the seals of a
train moving slowly on one track was hit and killed by the unlighted rear
car of a train backing in the opposite direction on the next track. A di-
rected verdict for the defendant was affirmed, and the court pointed out
that prior to the 1939 Amendment the decisions of the courts in similar
cases showed that liability on the part of the carrier was denied because
"it was guilty of no neglect in failing to safeguard the injured employee
from the ordinary risks of the business;"'" therefore, the court concluded,
the defense of assumed risk remained where the men were exposed to
the ordinary risks of the business.42
Upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed43 and made it clear that
assumption of risk, however stated, was no longer a defense under the
R.E.L.A. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, said:
We hold that every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of
risk was obliterated by the 1939 amendment, and that Con-
gress, by abolishing the defense of assumption of risk in that
statute, did not mean to leave open the identical defense for
the master by changing its name to "non-negligence." As
this Court said in facing the hazy margin between negligence
and assumption of risk as involved in the Safety Appliance Act
of 1893, "Unless great care be taken, the servant's rights will
be sacrificed by simply charging him with assumption of risk
under another name;" and no such result can be permitted
here. 4
4
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Earliest of the defenses in negligence cases under the common law
is contributory negligence, which was expounded by Lord Ellenborough
in Butterfield v. Forrester.45 To support an action the plaintiff had to
show that he was in the exercise of ordinary care.4" Thus, contributory
40 128 F. 2d 420, C.C.A. 4th (1942).
4 1 Id. at page 423.
421d. at page 424:
"The conclusion is inescapable that Congress did not intend to enlarge the
obligation of carriers to look out for the safety of their men when exposed to the
ordinary risks of the business, and that in circumstances other than those provided
for in the amended section of the statute, the doctrine of assumption of risk must
be given its accustomed weight. It is beyond the power of this court to deny the
defense in this case. It presents no material difference of fact from situations
considered by the courts in numerous decisions and held to be free from negligence
on the part of the carriers, and we have no authority to prescribe new standards
of conduct in the important field of railroad operations."
43 Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1942).
4 4 1d. at page 58.
45 11 East 60 (1809).
40 "A party is not cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made
by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself use common
and ordinary caution to be in the right. In cases of persons riding upon what is
considered to be the wrong side of the road, that would not authorize another
purposely to ride up against them. One person being in fault will not dispense with
[Vol. 1,7
negligence barred the plaintiff from any recovery; it was a complete
defense.
When the fellow-servant doctrine, assumption of risk and con-
tributory 'negligence were all complete defenses to an action against the
employer, the ultimate result of the case was the same whether one or
all three of the defenses were established. Consequently, if there was
some misuse of terms or inaccurate application of definitions, the dis-
tinctions had more theoretical than practical effect. It was not until one
or more of the defenses had been limited or abolished that it became
vitally important to determine precisely which defense was involved.
This, in turn, required careful analysis to distinguish between superficially
similar defenses.
Throughout the history of the law of master and servant, and
particularly under the F.E.L.A. and the Safety Appliance Acts, the
greatest difficulty has been encountered in defining and distinguishing
assumption of risk and contributory negligence, and in classifying a set
of facts as one or the other.
Though the accuracy of the statement may be challenged, 47 it has
been held that assumption of risk arises out of contract, and contributory
negligence from tort.4" The distinction between the two has been ex-
pressed in terms of chronological sequence in that assumption of risk
occurs before the negligent act of the employer, whereas the employee's
action thereafter, if improper, constitutes contributory negligence.
49
Somewhat differently stated, knowledge of the risk is the watchword of
the defense of assumption of risk, and want of due care in view thereof
is that of contributory negligence;5 ° acquiescence with knowledge of the
another's using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support
this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want
of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff." Ibid.
47Rese v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 107 Minn. 260, 120 N.W.
360 (1909).
"The view that assumption of risk is a matter of contract and contributory
negligence one of tort is fallacious. Both are equally peculiar to the law of torts
and implied from conduct. Assumption of risk is passive submission to the risk
of injury inherent in a known defect. Contributory negligence arises when the
servant's act adds new dangers to those incidental to conditions."
48Whisenhunt v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 195 S.C. 213, 10 S.E. 2d 305
(1940). McAdoo v. Angellotte, C.C.A. 2, 271 Fed. 268 (1921). Gray v. Garrison,
49 Ga. App. 472, 176 S.E. 412 (1934). Cobia v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 188
N.C. 487, 125 S.E. 18 (1924). Chicago, R.I.&P. Ry. Co. v. King, 165 Okla. 169,
25 P. 2d 304 (1932).
4 9 Johnson v. Mammoth Vein Coal Co., 88 Ark. 243, 114 S.W. 722 (1908).
"The preliminary conduct of getting into the dangerous employment is said
to be accompanied by assumption of risk. The act more immediately leading to a
specific accident is called negligent."
50 Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, C.C.A. 6, 236 Fed. 1 (1916).
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Richardson, C.A.A. 6, 116 F. 2d 860 (1941), cert.
den. 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
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risks involved is not contributory negligence because one can be fully
aware of the defects and yet use the utmost care to avert the dangers
which they threaten.
5 1
At times the distinctions are so slight that they are difficult to follow
on logic alone. For example, it has been held that if there are two ways
in which an act can be done, one safe and the other dangerous, the em-
ployee's selection of the latter is contributory negligence and not as-
sumption of risk.52 On the other hand, assumption of risk and not con-
tributory negligence applies in the case of an injury due to an obvious
defect in a "simple tool".
5 3
It must be remembered that over the many years during which the
courts have had to decide whether the conduct of the railroad employee
in a particular case amounted to assumption of risk or contributory negli-
gence, the determination of that fact has had a widely variable effect
upon the action, depending upon the year in which the case arose. Before
1893, both assumption of risk and contributory negligence were complete
defenses.
By enactment of the F.E.L.A. in 1908, contributory negligence
was no longer a bar to recovery, but could be asserted in diminution of
damages.54 Thus, before 1908 contributory negligence was a complete
defense, and after that date it was a partial defense to liability under the
F.E.L.A. Assumption of risk was a complete defense that was not
affected by the F.E.L.A. until the amendment in 1939," which entirely
eliminated that defense from the F.E.L.A.
The overlapping of dates is further complicated by the relation of
these two defenses to the Safety Appliance Act. Enacted in 1893,r" it was
the first legislation by Congress to establish liability of an interstate car-
rier to its employees for injuries resulting from inadequacy or failure of
51 Hesse v. Railroad Co., 58 Ohio S. 167, 169, 50 N.E. 354, 355 (1898). Cetola
v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 89 N.J.L. 691, 99 At. 310 (1916). St. Louis & S.F. Ry.
Co. v. Sears, 173 Okla. 483, 49 P 2d 489 (1935).
52 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Morrill, 211 Ala. 39, 99 So. 297 (1924). Illinois
Central R. Co. v. Skinner's Adms., 177 Ky. 62, 197 S.W. 552 (1917). Fort Street
Union Depot Co. v. Hillen, C.C.A. 6, 119 F. 2d 307 (1941) cert. den. 314 U.S. 642
(1941). Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Fultz, 191 Ind. App. 639, 161 N.E. 835
(1928) cert, den. 282 U.S. 855 (1930).
53Pryor v. Williams, 254 U.S. 43 (1920), reversing 272 Mo. 613, (1917) in
which the Missouri Supreme Court said:
"If the defects were so glaring, and the clawbar so patently defective that
an ordinary prudent servant would not have used it, then its use under such cir-
cumstances was negligence on the part of the servant. . . ."
See also, Donahue v. Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co., 183 Ky. 608, 210 S.W.
491 (1919) ; St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Sears, 173 Okla. 483, 49 P. 2d 489 (1935).
5445 U.S.C. 53.
55 53 STAT. 1404, c. 685, §1, 45 U.S.C. 54.
5645 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
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equipment, such as brakes,57 couplers,58 grab irons59 or drawbars."
Section 7 of the Safety Appliance Act61 eliminated assumption of risk
as a defense. However, contributory negligence was not mentioned in
that Act, and it therefore remained as a common law defense until
enactment of the F.E.L.A. in 1908. By Section 3 of the F.E.L.A6
contributory negligence has not only been modified as to liability under
the F.E.L.A. but entirely eliminated as a defense-to an action brought
under the Safety Appliance Act.
In reading the many cases that decided close or borderline factual
situations as to whether the conduct was labeled assumption of risk or
contributory negligence, one cannot escape the thought, or even the con-
clusion, that frequently the case was first decided, and then the proper
designation was made to achieve the result. All too frequently it seemed
that the decisions non-suited railroad employees by applying the name
assumption of risk to that which might have been called contributory
negligence, and vice versa. However, in some cases the employee bene-
fited. One such case"3 was an action under the Safety Appliance Act
before enactment of the F.E.L.A., so that contributory negligence was
still a defense but assumption of risk was not. There the decedent was
a brakeman who had been ordered to make a coupling, and to do so he
had to go between the cars. In failing to hit the slot, while attempting
to guide the drawbar, he sustained fatal injuries. Justice Holmes found
difficulty in drawing a sharp distinction between assumption of risk and
contributory negligence, and observed that the difference between the
two is one of degree rather than kind. 4
Some other comparable situations have fallen on one side or the
other of the close and wavering line between assumption of risk and
contributory negligence. Where plaintiff's violation of a company rule
was one of two or more causative factors that produced the accident,
5727 STAT. 531, c. 196, §1, 45 U.S.C. 1.
58 27 STAT. 531, c. 196, §2, 45 U.S.C. 2.
5927 STAT. 531, c. 196, §4, 45 U.S.C. 4.
6027 STAT. 531, c. 196, §5, 45 U.S.C. 5.
6127 STAT. 532, c. 196, §7, 45 U.S.C. 7.
6235 STAT. 66, c. 149, §3, 45 U.S.C. 53.
03 Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester, etc. Ry., 205 U.S. 1 (1907).
04Id. at page 12:
" ..Apart from the notion of contract, rather shadowy as applied to this
broad form of the latter conception, proximity to the particular harm. The pre-
liminary conduct of getting into the dangerous employment or relation is said to be
accompanied by assumption of risk. The act more immediately leading to a specific
accident is called negligence. But the difference between the two is one of degree
rather than of kind; and when a statute exonerates a servant from the former,
if at the same time it leaves the defense of contributory negligence still open
to the master, a matter upon which we express no opinion, then, unless great
care be taken, the servant's rights will be sacrificed by simply charging him with
assumption of risk under another name. .. "
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his action was ordinarily styled contributory negligence. 5 However,
where one who had a "primary" duty failed in respect thereto, such
conduct barred him completely, although the negligence of other em-
ployees concurred. This became known as the "primary duty" rule.
In one case a freight train had stopped because a drawbar had pulled out
of one of its cars. The brakeman remained in the caboose instead of
dropping back to warn a following passenger train. He was killed when
the freight train was struck by the passenger train.6" The Supreme Court
did not attempt to analyze or classify the conduct of the decedent, but
merely decided against the plaintiff by saying that "there is no justification
for a comparison of negligences or the apportioning of their effect." '67
The "primary duty" rule was developed further in a series of cases in
which Justice Holmes felt that it would be a "perversion of the statute"
to allow any recovery to the superior whose negligence was combined
with that of his subordinate."8 Subsequently, he used the proximate cause
approach by concluding that "A failure to stop a man from doing what
he knows he ought not to do, hardly can be called a cause of his act."69
The need for deft use of language on this subject was obviated by the
1939 amendment, and since that time it has been uniformly held that the
primary duty rule had been thereby abolished.7
As assumption of risk can no longer be used to defeat recovery, and
contributory negligence can only reduce plaintiff's verdict but not pre-
lude it, it is appropriate to consider the theories now relied upon to deny
liability. Whether the term used is sole negligence (of the plaintiff),
non-negligence, or proximate cause, they all amount to exactly the same
thing.
' 65Rocco v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 288 U.S. 275 (1933). Terminal R. Assn.
v. Farris, C.C.A. 8, 69 F. 2d 779 (1934). Southern Ry Co. v. Glenn, 228 Ala. 563,
154 So. 792 (1934). Brock v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 330 Mo. 918, 51 S.W. 2d 100
(1932).
66 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U.S. 444 (1916).
6 7 Id. at p. 448.
68 Frese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 263 U.S. 1, 3 (1923).
"Whatever may have been the practice, he could not escape his duty, and
it would be a perversion of the Employers' Liability Act to hold that he could
recover for an injury primarily due to his failure to act as required, on the
ground that possibly the injury might have been prevented if his subordinate
had done more."
Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U.S. 147, 148 (1924).
"It seems to us a perversion of the statute to allow his representative to
recover for an injury directly due to his failure to act as required on the ground
that possibly it might have been prevented if those in secondary relation to the
movement had done more."
69 Unadilla Valley R. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U.S. 138, 142 (1928). Southern
Ry. Co. v. Youngblood, 286 U.S. 313 (1931).
7 0 Keith v. Wheeling & L.E. R. Co., C.C.A. 6, 160 F. 2d 654 (1947). Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Mangum, 250 Ala. 431, 34 So. 2d 848 (1948). Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 801, 38 S.E. 2d 610 (1946). Missouri-Kansas-
T.xas R. Co. v. Webb, Texas, 229 S.W. 2d 204 (1950).
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Sole negligence refers to the claim that only the plaintiff was negli-
gent, or at least only the plaintiff's own negligence contributed to cause
his injury. The logical, and therefore necessary, conclusion must be that
the defendant was not negligent because only one of the parties was
negligent, solely the plaintiff.
Non-negligence presumably refers to the absence of negligence on
the part of the defendant. In such cases the defense of contributory
negligence does not even arise, because the term itself presupposes that
there is negligence other than the plaintiff's."' Therefore, if the defend-
ant railroad is not negligent, the plaintiff has not proved his case because
under the F.E.L.A. the railroad is not an insurer but is liable only on
the basis of negligence. 72
Proximate cause has been another argument used effectively after
assumption of risk was no longer a defense under the F.E.L.A. to avoid
the assessment of event partial damages. The reasoning went along the
line that assuming that the employee and railroad were both careless,
only the negligence of the employee, and not that of the railroad, was a
proximate cause of the accident. In this fashion the plaintiff had to clear
two hurdles, first, to establish negligence of the defendant, and then to
establish the proximate relation of the defendant's negligence and also
to disassociate his own conduct from the proximate cause. This contention,
however, does not take into account the very broad language used to
define liability under the F.E.L.A. for injury or death "resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence . . ." of the carrier.:7 ' The words
"in part" have been held to relax the older concept of' proximate cause
which confined its limits to a "direct" or "efficient" cause, and to enlarge
the scope of negligence for which the carrier is liable. 4
Since the 1939 amendment, not only has assumption of risk been
removed as a defense in all its forms, but, even more important, there
has been a clear and definite trend in the decisions toward effectuating
the purposes of the Act. Courts have become more jury conscious on the
question of contributory negligence. Comparisons of fault are for the
jury only to judge." Contributory negligence cannot be decided by the
court.7 6 It has even been said that for practical purposes there is only
left the question of whether the carrier was negligent and whether that
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury.77
71 9 Words and Phrases 382.
7 2 See note 32, supra.
7345 U.S.C. 51.
- Eglsaer v. Scandrett, C.C.A. 7, 151 F. 2d 562 (1945).
75 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 (1949). Cf. Concurring opinion of
Justice Frankfurter at p. 65. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 196 (1949). Terminal
R. Assn. of St. Louis v. Scharb, C.C.A. 8, 151 F. 2d 361 (1945).
76 Keith v. Wheeling & L. E. R. Co., C.C.A. 6, 160 F. 2d 654 (1947).
77 Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., C.C.A. 2, 137 F. 2d 527 (1943). Francis
v. Terminal R. Assn. 354 Mo. 1232, 193 S.V. 2d 909 (1946).
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The effect of contributory negligence under the F.E.L.A. is some-
what different from its application under the common law and other
statutes. Under the common law contributory negligence was a complete
defense, and there was no recovery by an employee who was guilty of
contributory negligence."' This rule likewise applied in many states. The
more equitable and humanitarian rule of apportioning damages, or com-
parative negligence, was written into the F.E.L.A. at the time of its
enactment, and has remained without change. Comparative negligence
has been applied in several ways.
In Wisconsin,79 if the plaintiff's negligence is not as great as the
defendant's, he will not be barred, but the rule of comparative negligence
is then applied to diminish a total recovery. Carried to an extreme, a
plaintiff guilty of 49%o' of the combined negligence may recover 51%o of
his damages, whereas he recovers nothing if the parties were equally at
fault. In Nebraska"o and South Dakota8 contributory negligence is not
a bar to recovery when it is slight and defendant's negligence gross by
comparison. The terms "slight" and "gross" are indefinite, comparative
and variable; there is a wide latitude for interpretation, both by the jury
and by the courts.
Under section 3 of the K.E.L.A., s2 where the plaintiff has been
guilty of contributory negligence, "damages shall be diminished by the
jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such em-
ployee." This provides for a diminution of damages because of con-
tributory negligence, 8 and in the proportion that the plaintiff's negligence
bears to the combined negligence of both parties.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of the law of master and servant, as applied in rail-
road cases, began in an era when Congress and the courts were sympa-
thetic and responsive to the needs of a new and growing business. The
worker had not yet effectively impressed the justice of his position upon
judicial thinking. Hence, all three of the common law defenses, the
fellow-servant doctrine, assumption of risk and contributory negligence,
78 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baker, C.C.A. 7, 91 Fed. 224 (1899).
Hodges v. Kimball, C.C.A 4, 104 Fed. 745 (1900). Denver & R.G.R.Co. v. Arright,
C.C.A. 8, 129 Fed. 347 (1904). Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Gordon, C.C.A. 7,
177 Fed. 152 (1909). Borhmer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., C.C.A. 2, 252 Fed. 553
(1918), aff. 252 U.S. 496 (1920).
79 Wisc. STAT. Sec. 331.045, adopted 1931.
80 NE. REVISED STATUTES (1943) §25-1151, adopted 1913.
81 S. DAKOTA CODE, §47,0304-1, adopted 1941.
82 5 STAT. 66, 45 U.S.C. 53.
83 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114 (1913). Seaboard Air
Line R. Co. v. Tilghman, 237 U.S. 499 (1915). Illinois Central R. Co. v. Skaggs,
240 U.S. 66 (1916). Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Cole, C.C.A. 6, 214 Fed. 948 (1914).
New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Niebel, C.C.A. 6, 214 Fed. 952 (1914). New
York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Aigler, 10 Ohio App. 195 (1917). Hutchins v. Ahvn,
Canton & Youngstown R. Co., C.C.A. 6, 162 F. 2d 189 (1947).
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were available to absolve a railroad of liability by reason of injuries
negligently inflicted upon employees. As the employee acquired greater
stature, both politically and economically, the balance shifted until it has
been recognized by judicial expression of the Supreme Court that the
F.E.L.A. was designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost
of the legs, eyes, arms and lives which it consumed in its operations.
8 4
Without reviewing the year by year change, suffice it to say that in
this field of law the fellow-servant rule and assumption of risk have been
laid to rest. Contributory negligence has been discarded as a defense
under the Safety Appliance Act, and has been retained as part of the
F.E.L.A. only as comparative negligence in diminution of damages.
Thus, there has been a definite trend away from the old philosophy
of creating a liability for the consequences of negligence and then
effecting a nullification by the imposition of conclusive defenses. Congress
has reflected the changed thinking on the subject by enacting appropriate
legislation. Under the present state of the law, and the realistic approach
that currently marks judicial interpretation of it, defenses to the F.E.L.A.
are indeed limited.
84 Concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336
U.S. 53, 68 (1949).
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was designed to put on the railroad
industry some of the cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consmed in
its operations. Not all these costs were imposed, for the Act did not make the
employer an insurer. The liability which it imposed was the liability for negli-
gence. But judges had created numerous defenses-fellow-servant rule, assumption
of risk, contributory negligence--so that the employer was often effectively insulated
from liability even though it was responsible for maintenance of unsafe conditions
of work. The purpose of the Act was to change that strict rule of liability, to lift
from employees the 'prodigious burden' of personal injuries which that system
had placed upon them, and to relieve men 'who by the exigencies and necessities of
life are bound to labor' from the risks and hazards that could be avoided or
lessened 'by the exercise of proper care on the part of the employer in providing
safe and proper machinery and equipment with which the employee does his work"'
19561
